Minilaterals are informal initiatives comprising a small group of states that share the same goal and aim to address a specific challenge. With voluntary commitments, minilaterals provide a flexible approach to international cooperation. The origin of minilaterals can be traced back to the post-second World War period when minilateralism and multilateralism are said to have co-existed, as most of the multilateral institutions that were formed were often negotiated through ‘disguised’ minilateralism. However, it was only in recent years that a steady rise in minilateral groups has been witnessed in security, trade, and climate change. This proliferation of minilaterals is often associated with the inability of multilateral organisations to foster international cooperation on the critical issues the countries face. While minilaterals focus on assembling the ‘critical mass’ of members required for a specific purpose, some minilaterals can be differentiated from others because of the strategic critical mass they produce and their potential impact on the regional order, and are referred to as “strategic minilaterals.”
Key Minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific and their Strategic Drivers
The Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) has witnessed a resurgence of minilateral frameworks of regional cooperation in recent years, to address security and economic issues.
The Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) was established in 2002 building “an integrated deterrence function among the allies.” The proto-alliance aimed to serve wider strategic purposes, similar to the recent strategic minilateral called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the US.
The changing geopolitical dynamics in the IPR have given rise to minilateral groupings such as QUAD. China’s diplomacy and close economic interactions with strategic implications in the region have led to minilateral initiatives by the US with its allies. The QUAD Declaration after the first QUAD Summit in 2021 in the form of a joint statement defined the ‘spirit of QUAD’ by emphasising a region that is open, free, inclusive and democratic. In recent years, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has grown increasingly fractured, giving rise to minilaterals such as QUAD.
The other two groupings are the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) and Australia-UK-US (AUKUS), both centred on minilateral defence and technology cooperation. The GCAP includes Japan, the UK, and Italy in jointly producing a sixth-generation stealth fighter. Notably, bilateral strategic partnerships play a significant role in providing foundations for these minilateral groupings. AUKUS was formed in 2021 with the twin objectives of maintaining a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. AUKUS aims to share nuclear submarine technology with Australia and jointly develop capabilities in areas like defence, maritime, cyber, information and technology sharing and artificial intelligence. The 2022 US Indo-Pacific Strategy highlighted the significance of ‘alliances and partnerships’ in the Indo-Pacific, thus minilaterals such as QUAD and AUKUS. While both groupings aim to tackle security challenges, the approach and means could differ; for instance, AUKUS concentrates almost exclusively on ‘hard power’, though strengthening complementarities with QUAD.
The latest addition to the series of minilateral groups in the region was the SQUAD in May 2024, which includes the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and the US. Just like AUKUS, all member countries of the SQUAD are largely Washington’s security treaty partners. SQUAD is likely to coordinate its actions with QUAD for regional stability.
Focus Areas and Achievements
Countries prefer minilaterals that can engage in several security and economic areas instead of relying on one fragmented regional group. QUAD aims to secure a rule-based global order, a liberal trading system, and freedom of navigation. QUAD working groups have been established to engage in major issues of public interest across the globe, including health, education, infrastructure, communications, cyber and space. Thereby, a balancing approach can be seen in QUAD’s security and development objectives in the region.
In the security domain, QUAD is a work-in-progress with four countries having similar strategic goals but differing on means to achieve them. For example, unlike Australia, Japan, and the US, which are treaty alliance partners, India firmly avoids formal alliances. However, the four countries came together for a common vision: a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, which has provided some coherence to the emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
QUAD is working towards bolstering maritime security. During the 2024 QUAD Leaders’ Summit, the Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI) was launched to help regional partners enforce their laws, secure their waters and deter unlawful behaviour. Additionally, to enhance the interoperability among the Coast Guard forces of member countries, a first-ever QUAD-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission was announced, which is scheduled to commence in 2025.
QUAD also aims to deliver resilient and quality infrastructure to build regional capacity, increase connectivity, and meet critical needs. Furthermore, the 2023 QUAD Leaders’ Summit culminated in a key announcement on the formation of the QUAD Health Security Partnership for capacity-building in the region in the health sector. Also, QUAD is planning to expand its Early Warning System (EWS), which will help enhance access to high-quality climate services by Pacific Island Countries (PICs). The QUAD nations are enhancing their readiness to respond swiftly to any natural disaster in the region. In 2022, the Guidelines for the QUAD Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific were signed. The QUAD remains committed to utilising emerging technologies for the benefit of people in the region to promote economic prosperity.
Conclusion, Prospects And Recommendations
QUAD and AUKUS are different, but interlinked strands in the emerging geopolitical and geoeconomic churning of the Indo-Pacific. The main idea is to find a synergy between QUAD, AUKUS and ASEAN. The primary driving force behind the emergence of these minilaterals is shifting the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Given the power dynamics in the region, more minilaterals are likely to emerge, which could potentially alter conventional regional multilateral frameworks. However, the rising phenomenon of minilateralism in the region should not be viewed as a complete replacement of existing institutions and alliances, but as a complement to them. Eventually, the successful outcomes in the minilateral settings can be transferred to multilateral platforms to gain support from the broader community. India prefers QUAD, while the AUKUS alliance provides space for potential expansion. Although QUAD is low in security, it is not devoid of it. The proliferation of minilateral arrangements suggests that security in the Indo-Pacific is underpinned by area-specific and flexible elements of cooperation rather than rigid and traditional alliances.
